The Probligo

Sunday, July 10, 2005

The essential probligo... FWIW!

Dave Farrar had this link up on his site, which led eventuially to this. Well never one to shirk a challenge, no matter how pseudo-scientific it might be, here is a "psychological picture" of the probligo -

Extraversion

Your score on Extraversion is average, indicating you are neither a subdued loner nor a jovial chatterbox. You enjoy time with others but also time alone.

Extraversion Facets

Friendliness

Gregariousness

Assertiveness

Activity Level

Excitement-Seeking

Cheerfulness

Agreeableness

Your high level of Agreeableness indicates a strong interest in others' needs and well-being. You are pleasant, sympathetic, and cooperative.

Agreeableness Facets

Trust

Morality

Altruism

Cooperation

Modesty

Sympathy

Conscientiousness

Your score on Conscientiousness is average. This means you are reasonably reliable, organized, and self-controlled.

Conscientiousness Facets

Self-Efficacy

Orderliness

Dutifulness

Achievement-Striving

Self-Discipline

Cautiousness

Neuroticism

Your score on Neuroticism is low, indicating that you are exceptionally calm, composed and unflappable. You do not react with intense emotions, even to situations that most people would describe as stressful.

Neuroticism Facets

Anxiety

Anger

Depression

Self-Consciousness

Immoderation

Vulnerability

Openness to Experience

Your score on Openness to Experience is average, indicating you enjoy tradition but are willing to try new things. Your thinking is neither simple nor complex. To others you appear to be a well-educated person but not an intellectual.
Openness Facets

Imagination

Artistic Interests

Emotionality

Adventurousness

Intellect

Liberalism

And from the same set of links comes a "political profile as well...

Your political compass
Economic Left/Right: -2.13
Social Libertarian/Authoritarian: -2.10

Friday, July 08, 2005

London

There is a sadness in my heart that I can not express.

There is nothing in this world that can justify the use of such weapons to kill and maim the innocent or to create terror.

There is no injustice that warrants this manner of response.

There is no justification.

There is no right.

Wednesday, July 06, 2005

Mr Swindells, I for one beg to differ...

Well, it IS the news of the week. Everyone else has had a good crack at it. Even this week’s Listener in another of its moments of prescience, and probably penned three weeks ago, has the issue as its cover story.

It is also, after the (much debated) “...gone by lunchtime...” remark attributed to Brash Donnie going to be one of the “election issues”. To be fair, Brash Donnie is saying that “National’s policy is unchanged”. Apparently that means that they will not change the law without an electoral mandate, either by way of referendum, or by electing the National party with removal of all or part of the anti-nuclear legislation as its policy. That last little piece really begs the question though, doesn’t it? Brash is firm, the anti-nuclear legislation is not policy.

Yet.

Apart from the Listener though, the issue would have muttered on were it not for the retiring U.S. Ambassador Mr Charles Swindell. Within hours of his Independence Day speech, the news, bloggers, political commentators, party supporters and all from Auntie Helen to Mr Chaudhry were having their say. Admittedly, some stupid little reporter got confused and (instead of asking Mr Chaudhry about the anti-nuclear legislation ) pursued some ridiculous line about stoning and the Qu’ran. Why did she not ask Graham Caple about whether he supported crucifixion as a punishment. Well it is in the Bible after all as punishment for those who think themselves above the law. Not, I rush to add, that I think Mr Swindells considers himself above the law, not at all. Mr Caple might but that is also another story.

Coverage of Swindells’ speech is now universal, so I am not going to republish here. There are any number of sources that will have it – try www.nzherald.co.nz and read their Editorial while you are there. Well put.

But there is a discordance here; a wrong note in the music of the spheres.

As I said, the speech was Mr Swindells’ farewell, and made specifically for Independence Day. Does he think that our Nuclear Free legislation in some way makes us LESS independent? Well I concede that there are political barriers that have been the consequence of the legislation. That might be limiting to some freedoms. Like sending nuclear powered ships to NZ for a bit of RnR for example. Or establishing a free trade agreement.

There is also another fact that I believe is fundamental to the genesis of the anti-nuclear legislation and by complete coincidence this past weekend was the anniversary of that event as well. One of the casualties of NZ's law was the ANZUS pact, one of those very popular mutual defence agreements from the Cold War. It, like so many others, stated that an attack on any of the parties would consititute an attack on all three parties.

In July 1985, NZ experienced its first, and so far only, terrorist attack. There was only one life lost, a matter of luck rather than incompetence on the part of the terrorists. The target was an elderly trawler named "Rainbow Warrior" owned by the Greenpeace Foundation. The terrorists were active servicemen (and women) of the French secret service.

I can not say that we won that little battle. We capitulated after France rallied trade sanctions within the EU against all product from this country.

But, what about ANZUS? If ever an American wants to know why I and so many other NZers are so sceptical about the reality of American politics and foreign policy look no further. The thunderous silence from both Australia and the US during the 18 months after July 1985, the endless offers of support and assistance did really make us in NZ feel part of the alliance.

To close that, remember that it was the French nuclear testing that was one of the critical seeds of this country's stand. It was not the attitude of our supposed friends.

But truly, all of this is ignoring the very real issue between this nation of mine and the United States is only evidenced by the nuclear free legislation, the ban on nuclear powered ships.

Mr Swindells himself, in October last year (the same time as the supposed Donnie quote) will recall telling the NZ Government that the United States would not “just get over it”.

It is not an attitude that is limited to the present administration. Over the past twenty years there have been regular reminders by envoys from Congress and the President that NZ’s anti-nuclear legislation “presents real barriers to relationships between our two nations.

It is at this point that I can appreciate the sentiments of those many Americans who support the call for “less government” in their lives. Most of those people are loyal and patriotic Americans. Do they really believe though that their nation has the right to dictate the legislation and law in another country? Well, apparently they do, as my complaint on behalf of lil ol’ NZ is a bagatelle by comparison with others. That, at the same time, does not make the interference either welcome or right.

There is the discord. On the day when Americans celebrate their independence from an oppressive (and mad) King George, there are repeated and official calls for this country to abrogate its right to independence for the convenience of another nation. Except that on this occasion these scarce concealed demands are made with the approval and agreement of President George – not King George.

Mr Swindells, I truly hope that you enjoyed celebrating your Independence Day in our fair country. I trust too that when you return to your own country to retire that you will take back to your President and Congress a very simple message - that the people of New Zealand are free, that they are a fiercely proud nation if small by most measures, and that friendship is to be earned and not dictated.

Sunday, July 03, 2005

Another view of "pre-emptive" and terrorism...

Hat tip to Dave Justus, and his link to Vodkapundit for this one...

Dave’s first reaction was more to the last part of Vodkapundit’s post on the relationship between public opinion and the media. Tired horse that one... Vodkapundit goes no further than just a mention.

What led VP’s post, and far more worthy of comment, is a paper on the development of the Bush administration’s interpretation of the extent of “pre-emption war” in the context of Iraq2. My read and response follows. The comments that follow VP’s post, and there are some 35 of them, are a fascinating snapshot of American public reaction. I think that all bar two of the posts debate either the number of civilian casualties in Iraq or why the “Russian empire” collapsed. Sigh.

My comments in italics, my emphasis in bold.

Preemption in the Present

A national consensus that rejected preventive war in the 1950s developed, as Brodie noted, with little debate. In a striking reversal, in 2002 the United States accepted, again with little deliberation, a national strategy of preemption (preventive war in 1950s terminology) as defined in the Bush Doctrine. Since the issuance of the 2002 National Security Strategy, the war in Iraq and the politics of a presidential election have absorbed Americans’ attention, forestalling a debate on the propriety and likely effectiveness of the nation’s first post-9/11 strategic doctrine.

Defense strategists and theorists, however, have begun the process of evaluating the merits and deficiencies of preemption for fighting a war against terrorists. Questions of terminology, international law, counterproliferation, multilateralism, military effectiveness, and ethical skepticism frame the developing dialogue.

The distinction made in the 1950s between preemption and preventive war has been lost in today’s debate, and the incorrect use of the term preemption when preventive war would be more accurate has significant consequences. Francois Heisbourg, chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, points out that current international law makes the distinction, and a lack of precision can create confusion between friend and foe alike. Potential allies may perceive such imprecision as an American inability to recognize the subtleties and nuances of diplomacy, resulting in decreased international confidence and hindering the prospect of a united front against terrorism. Indiscriminately swapping terms can also mislead potential enemies, convincing them to accelerate development of deterrent capabilities, namely weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to counter a perceived threat from the United States when none may in fact exist. Heisbourg concludes that preventive war is a potentially sustainable doctrine if the United States works closely with allies to clarify and precisely define the specific guidelines of preventive action, especially what constitutes an “imminent” threat.

The issue of imminence is also central to the question of preemption’s (or, really, prevention’s) legality. In respect to international law, preemption in the sense of preventive war may well be legal, according to law professor Anthony Clark Arend. By tradition, international law recognizes the right of a nation to act preemptively in self-defense provided that it (1) demonstrates necessity, that is, shows that another nation poses an imminent threat, and (2) that the action taken is in proportion to the threat, avoiding excessive force. Today’s preemption, as outlined by the Bush Doctrine, argues that the post-9/11 world requires a reassessment of “imminent,” that the proliferation of WMD and their potential nexus with terrorists has made obsolete the customary understanding of international law’s necessity requirement, especially of what constitutes an imminent threat. To date, the Bush Administration has offered only an implicit reinterpretation of “imminent,” while international law has shown no sign of change. Should international law come to accept the Bush Doctrine’s implied definition of imminent, “preemption may, in fact,” Arend concludes, “be lawful—even if politically unwise.”

How might a reconfigured meaning of imminent and preemption fit into international law? Neither international law nor the UN Charter addresses the current strategic environment where terrorists rather than nation-states threaten the lives of thousands of civilians, but strategist Terence Taylor proposes a set of three criteria to redefine what constitutes an imminent threat in the post-9/11 world. First, the gravity of the threat must be significant, such as that posed by WMD. Second, the method of delivery must be considered—not in relation to technology but in respect to the possibility of a specific warning. Terrorism’s reliance on secrecy and surprise generally denies any forewarning of an attack; thus, Taylor writes, “It can be argued that even a general threat could qualify as imminent in international law.” The final criterion is a declared intent by the potential attackers, such as al Qaeda’s pronouncements to make further and more devastating attacks against the United States. A threat that fits these criteria, Taylor suggests, “creates a pervasive sort of imminent threat that could demand anticipatory military action . . . at a point in time when the opportunity arises to eliminate the threat.” The validity of this standard in respect to international law is unclear, and will remain so until both American policymakers and their foreign counterparts establish clear and accepted definitions for terms like “imminent.” Resolution of this question “is as important to counter unjustified recourse to anticipatory military action as it is to provide protection to civilian populations against catastrophic attacks.” Being obsolete is a definitive failing of legislative and diplomatic processes. Quite apart from the anticipation of diplomatic semantics, Taylor particularly, and Carlisle miss the point here. Surely the critical thing in defending against terrorism and the prospective use of WMD is “Who do we attack?”

Leaving behind the definitions and semantics of international law raises the practical issue of applying a strategy of prevention in a world of WMD, terrorists, and the possible mixing of the two. Professor Jason Ellis, offering one perspective, maintains that preventive action should be part of a broader strategy of counterproliferation. Past efforts at nonproliferation of WMD, including ballistic missiles, he argues, have failed, and the Bush Administration has adopted a proactive response to the “proliferation-terrorism nexus.” By acting “offensively today to preclude the development and delivery of graver threats down the line,” the Administration has the best chance of stopping or mitigating the effects of the WMD proliferation that has already occurred. The challenge will be “translating this strategic guidance into credible operational capabilities and plans.” Taylor ( I presume) takes the line of “What the Bush administration has done is the only solution. I beg to differ.

Strategic theorists Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter agree that the time has passed for emphasizing nonproliferation, indeed arguing that the President’s strategy of preemption “does not go far enough.” Based on the UN’s “Responsibility to Protect” principle that defines a world responsibility to protect people’s lives and human rights through direct intervention if necessary, the authors propose a parallel “collective ‘duty to prevent’” rogue nations from obtaining or using WMD. “Old age thinking”. The threat is no longer from nation-states. That is the defect in current international law, and to a great extent in the US’s response to 9/11. In the post-9/11 environment, nations must act proactively to confront the threat of WMD; however, Feinstein and Slaughter maintain that the majority of effort must come through collective nonmilitary actions such as economic and diplomatic initiatives, sanctions, and embargoes. When these measures are fully exhausted, military alternatives undertaken by “unilateral action or coalitions of the willing should be considered.” Similar to Ellis, they point out that the question of who decides when the time has come to exercise the military option remains unanswered. Again, I see this as retrospective justification of the Bush approach. But I concede it also allows that mistakes were made. F & S at least are giving the nod in the direction of non-military solutions.

Offering a differing view, strategist Gu Guoliang argues that in practice, a strategy of prevention “won’t work.” To be successful, a strategy must be based on reliable intelligence that identifies the enemy’s specific intentions, capabilities, and location, and have legal standing and moral authority in the world community. Preventive warfare, he argues, fulfills none of these requirements and therefore will prove ineffective in stopping the use of WMD.
Citing former Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s warning that “American military superiority actually increases the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically,” Guoliang writes that preemption (prevention), can do nothing to prevent attacks by terrorists using trucks, ships, or jumbo jets. Moreover, preventive action by the United States both sets a precedent for other states to claim the same right of prevention and contributes to America’s unilateralist image. International cooperation, he suggests, is the key to international security. Multinational efforts to continue and strengthen nonproliferation programs will lessen the dangers posed by nation-states, while widespread cooperation among members of the world community can help reduce political, financial, and moral support for non-state threats.

Lawrence Freedman, who for decades has studied and commented on international strategy, reaches a similar conclusion. According to Freedman, deterrence is an outdated strategy of the Cold War, and a strategy of prevention will prove ineffective against the asymmetrical threat of terrorism; in short, “neither can form the basis of a new strategy.” The success of deterrence during the Cold War emanated from the balanced terror of Mutually Assured Destruction. Recognizing that each side marshaled sufficient firepower to annihilate the other dissuaded both from risking conflict, creating a stable if tense environment. Such a dynamic among forces today is unlikely, given the extremism and tactics of terrorists; there is little that can deter a suicide bomber. Nor does preemption present an effective defense framework, and here Freedman also distinguishes between preemption and prevention. Once more the question arises concerning the definition of imminent threat. Echoing others, Freedman maintains that in addition to concerns about legality, the practical implementation of anticipatory action is problematic. Identifying an imminent threat from a state is difficult; recognizing a similar threat from non-state groups like terrorists is essentially impossible. In very practical terms, preemption will not stop attacks like those of 11 September. Prevention, however, presents a possible alternative. Acknowledging that at times an imminent threat will likely require a preemptive military strike, Freedman argues that nonmilitary preventive actions, such as better intelligence, diplomatic initiatives, economic assistance, and improved technologies, can provide “sound guidance for dealing with the security problems within and arising from weak states.” In other words, address the sources and motivations of terrorists, rather than the consequences of their actions. But unlike a quick military fix, this approach requires a willingness “to engage difficult problems over an extended period of time.”

One final viewpoint to consider is that offered by Colonel Franklin Wester, an Army Reserve chaplain. Using Just War tradition to evaluate the ethical legitimacy of the Bush Doctrine as applied in the Iraq War, Wester argues that “the case of Iraq fails crucial ethical tests.” The United States at best only marginally met the standard for legitimate authority to initiate an invasion, there existed no imminent threat to the United States or its allies, and the Administration chose war not as a last resort but out of frustration over Saddam’s intransigence. In addition to arguing that the Bush Doctrine’s application in Iraq did not meet Just War’s ethical standards, Wester goes on to suggest, more significantly, that the National Security Strategy’s emphasis on preemption may signal an ethical paradigm shift that redefines “imminent threat” as “a clear danger [that] is not necessarily a present danger.” That, I suggest, is the greatest danger of all to the future of global peace and cooperation. It becomes not a matter of fact or proof but of belief.

Preemption’s Future?
Rather than an emerging consensus, these arguments make evident that the path forward in strategic planning is not clearly marked. Indeed, preemption’s implementation since its adoption as the foundation of the National Security Strategy has raised more questions and concerns than answers and solutions. The Bush Administration and its national security staff must evaluate whether preemption in its present form is the most appropriate and effective defense policy for a war against terrorism.

Will preemption provide an overarching framework for fighting a decades-long conflict as containment did during the Cold War? If not, a new strategic doctrine, perhaps one that emphasizes nonmilitary and special forces operations, must be crafted to counter successfully the radical extremist threat. On the other hand, maintaining preemption raises its own challenges. Diplomatic initiatives will need to address the international community’s perception that the United States has adopted unilateralism in practice if not in policy. This certainly is the perception that I have. It is a perception that is shared by the current NZ government. More specifically, the status of preemption in international law must be clarified, as well as the closely related issue of defining “imminent.” The United States needs to develop an accepted definition of what constitutes an imminent threat in the post-9/11 world, and this determination should be done in consultation with the nation’s allies.No, I disagree. It must be a common and global recognition. In regard to the practical application of preemption, military planners and strategists will need to generate tactical doctrines that can be applied both to nation-states who present traditional conventional and nuclear threats, and to non-state actors like al Qaeda who rarely present an identifiable target and who by the nature of their methods provide no prior warning. I differ here as well. It is my belief that by far the greatest threat to the US in particular, to its close allies more generally, and to a lesser extent globally will come from “formal groups of individuals”. How many people have forgotten that 9/11 was not the first terrorist action of its kind - Bader Meinhoff, the attack on the Israeli Olympic team at Berlin, the Achille Lauro, there are really so many since WW2. The only difference, the one thing that brought terrorism as a problem to international notice, was that the 9/11 attack was on New York. That is all. The lion was bearded in its own den. The President’s decision to execute any preemptive or preventive military operation will be based on his national security team’s recommendations and the intelligence assessments upon which they rely. As recent events demonstrate, reform is needed in both intelligence gathering and analysis.

In its position as the only superpower, the United States must lead the free world by developing a strategy—preemption or its successor—that, like containment, will gather the international support necessary to successfully fight a war against an amorphous and insidious enemy like al Qaeda. An understanding of strategic evolution since 6 August 1945 demonstrates the great challenges of crafting a successful defense policy, challenges that became even more complex after 11 September 2001. Preemption, the first attempt to define a security policy for this new strategic paradigm, will certainly undergo revision or replacement, not unlike the iterations of containment during the Cold War. This process, however, must begin with an evaluation of and debate over the policy itself. Defense strategists must learn from the history of preemption and prevention, and pursue a thoughtful reconsideration of America’s strategic doctrine.

America will likely be unsuccessful in the war against terrorists through military superiority alone. A doctrine of preemption without a substantial nonmilitary component may well place the United States in a strategic box similar to that of Dulles’s massive retaliation: undertake military operations on the scale of a national invasion or do nothing at all. In practice as much as in policy, America’s defense doctrine must include, as the National Security Strategy outlines, more sophisticated and nuanced diplomatic initiatives and humanitarian programs, efforts designed, in former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s words, “to reduce the underlying sources of terrorist motivation and recruitment.” As the Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, recently observed, “This war that we’re in is not going to be won militarily. . . . [It] really is a clash of ideas.” The second Bush Administration should work aggressively and sincerely to win not only military engagements but that clash of ideas and values, to win the support of world leaders and the peoples they govern, and to win back the hearts and minds of those who on 11 September 2001 stood shoulder to shoulder with America.

I will start by saying right out that I believe that one of the major miscalculations (of the many...) made by the Bush administration was the redefinition of “pre-emptive”, or the preferred “preventive” war that was implicit in the justification of Iraq2. This paper, in my mind, goes some way to showing where and how that redefinition has failed both in terms of the relationship between America and ROW, and too “on the ground” in Iraq.

It also shows, in the closing paragraphs, why Iraq2 has proven to be the major risk that many said it would be.

The first point that must be made is that even before 9/11, in fact the day after his inauguration, Bush had made his opinion of international law very clear. His repudiation of the agreements signed on behalf of the US Government relating to the International Court of Justice gave very clear notice that here was a President who had no time for the niceties of international diplomacy, and even less regard for the standing of international agreements. On those grounds alone, any international law that stood between the Bush administration and its intended goals would either bend or be ignored.

In the context of the Carlisle paper, the international law relating to pre-emption or preventive war would not have been a factor at all. From that point of view Carlisle is speaking in a retrospective examination of “might have beens” arriving at a “justification of the could have beens”. And it is that point that I want to pick up.

One of the very difficult things about international law, law of any kind really, is that it is “reactive” rather than forward looking. There is always a stable door to be bolted, rather than making sure that the horses can not run away.

And at that point I go back and read Carlisle’s concluding paragraph again and think to myself “Yes. Right on.” What a pity that it took Iraq2 and two more years for that realisation to surface.

Well I never...

What Famous Leader Are You?
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The Probligo

Sunday, July 10, 2005

The essential probligo... FWIW!

Friday, July 08, 2005

London

Wednesday, July 06, 2005

Mr Swindells, I for one beg to differ...

Sunday, July 03, 2005

Another view of "pre-emptive" and terrorism...

Well I never...

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