Similarly there has been a lot of baying for the blood of Don Rumsfeld in the military press this morning. They are coming to the realization that he is “not the best Secretary of Defence there has ever been”.
But is this really what should be happening?
There was a quiet, somewhat brief, mention in the local news that the National Security Archive had released a paper on “war games” involving an invasion of Iraq. As in “declassified”?
Well, Alice would have loved this one as “curiouser and curiouser” it truly is.
The first reference took me to GWU’s National Security archive. Well, I guess that has some logic to it. The link at the end of their release however was a “404”. Hmm, curious?
Google again… this time for National Security Archive.
Ah Ha!! And there is a piccyture of the said report!! A line banged through the middle of the word "Secret" yet!!
Yep, sho’nuf, there it is again, right there!! Along with these two darling little quotes…
"There was consensus that the United States would not intervene without coalition support except under the most dire circumstances such as WMD use or catastrophic humanitarian disaster."
- Desert Crossing After Action Report, 1999.
"When it looked like we were going in, I called back down to CENTCOM and said, 'You need to dust off Desert Crossing.' They said, 'What's that? Never heard of it.'"
- General Anthony Zinni (ret.), 2004.
That also contained the main substance of the news report that I had heard. But I don’t think that we are quite there yet. One more link and BINGO!!
The Executive Summary on its own makes for interesting reading.
So, why is this “curious”?
Well for a starter, the report date – 1999 – and the declassification date – 2004.
The report dates from Clinton’s Presidency. I suspect that it should have been the foundation stone for any reticence that there may have been at that time for solving the Iraq question by invasion.
That of itself adds a “curiouser yet” when we recall the blame and imprecations heaped upon Clinton for not having taken action. Here is a very primary defence – the National Security Agency were recommending against invasion without some very careful and thorough appraisals of the risks involved. But, never once has it been mentioned... until now.
The second is that the report – see my little quote above – was so “secret” that even CENTCOM knew nothing of it in 2003. Curiouser yet is the fact that only some 12 months later it was declassified. How important and secret is that? So curiouser yet – the highest levels of the US Army knew nothing of it? Even after General Zinni’s phone call to his mates in CENTCOM, it seems that there was very little done with the report prior to the invasion. After all virtually every recommendation in that report was ignored.
Despite all that, the US blogiverse seems happy with the Perle (sorry) that has been cast before them. They are happy to bay at the smiling Rumsfeld or, like the Queen of Hearts, shout "Off with 'is head!!" at every turn.
Sadly, it seems there may be many more heads to fall.
Curiouser and curiouser… not least of which is "Is it a fake?"
13 comments:
The report you link to was produced by Centcom, so obviously they had access to it. If they didn't know about it, it wasn't because it was classified from them, but because it was not considered important.
In my opinion, it is an accurate, but trivial analysis of what a post-Saddam Iraq would be like. Pretty much everything it says is accurate, but that was also obvious, which is why I don't think Centcom thought of it as being that important.
Iran would cause problems: Yes, that was obvious. What to do about it other than the long difficult job of building up an Iraq that can resist on its own is less obvious.
Sectarian divides would cause problems: Also obvious, once again, there is no simple, quick answer to the problem.
Debt relief for Iraq would be important: Also obvious and a huge amount of effort went into securing it.
Identifying Leaders within Iraq: Obivous, but impossible to do before Saddam was gone.
Frankly, I don't see anything particularly surprising or useful there.
Hmm, Dave, I guess that once again it is a matter of POV.
If the "Desert Crossing" exercise was so "trivial", then one would expect that the accusations of mismanagement and poor planning would concentrate on all of the more important factors rather than the difficulties foreseen in this report.
But that was not my point.
What is apparent, from Zinni's comments, is that the planning and strategies developed in "Desert Crossing" seem to have been entirely and totally ignored.
That oversight, whether deliberate or unintentional, does not ( I must say in fairness) seem to have been limited to the political wing.
That oversight continues in the US blogiverse, with most seeming to prefer the role of Queen of Hearts and shouting "Off with his head!!" to and about all and sundry.
Is "Desert Crossing" that immaterial, that trivial?
I believe it should have been front and centre on every desk involved in the planning of Iraq2. From SecDef on down.
But, I guess that because the MSM have not been making a huge noise about the report at any time since it was decassified in 2004, it must therefore be trivial...
And Wonderland it is...
Okay, lets turn it around.
What policy differences would have resulted if Desert Crossing had been paid attention to? What is so illuminating that I am missing?
OK, let’s just take two trivial points from the main body of the report; from the summary of the concluding remarks of the principals in the exercise.
The serious void in U.S. understanding of the humanitarian problems in Iraq must be filled. Conflicting reports abound, obscuring a sound assessment of the present conditions in Iraq. This information must be obtained so that planners can extrapolate the likely extent of deterioration and required actions to be taken in response.
So what did the US do?
Well, they started with a full-blown military intervention. Iraq2 was never about humanitarian relief. With the way that history has been rewritten in the intervening years there were any number of differing (even conflicting) reasons for the invasion. That is the cause; the effect was that the likely extent of deterioration and required actions to be taken in response. was at best severely under-assessed or even ignored.
The involvement of Iraq’s neighbours in any operation is critical to success. The future of Iraq – but especially the region – is too critical for the United States not to be invoved. Therefore planning for a quick entrance and exit should not be considered as a possible option. What comes out of all this is also important in terms of how it impacts what we need to do in the region in the future,. An intervention that would completely reshape the Iaqi state will likely have a deep impact on how the region operates in future.
So what did the US do?
Well I confess that there probably was some consultation, some attempt to involve Iraq’s neighbours. But given the nature of Bush’s rallying cry (his most unfortunate “either for or against us” approach) I would hold little hope for consultation and negotiation, great fear of “we don’t care what you think, this is what we are doing”.
So, what could have been done that might have made Iraq2 more “effective”?
1. Involvement of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, in addition to Pakistan. The very minimum would be their public agreement that Saddam was a problem that was needing a rapid and forceful solution.
2. Waiting for there to be a direct humanitarian need for intervention. It might not have been any more honest than the WMD case put to UNSC by Powell. It would have been somewhat easier to sell to the world community.
3. Finish Afghanistan first, then rest the army up for a bit, so that sufficient resources could be committed to the task in Iraq.
The point being, Dave, that you speak now with 20/20 hindsight. What were you saying in 2003? "Gogettem"? Or "hang on, there are things we need talk about here"?
"Desert Crossing" was a report that said the latter, some five years before it happened.
Humitarian reasons were one, among many, reasons for invading Iraq. All the major political leaders in support of the war, including George Bush and Tony Blair mentioned it. Saying this was tacked on later is a flat out lie.
However, clearly it was not the primary reason or an issue that in 2003 was especially urgent. To the extent that Desert Storm (a pre-9/11) document, forsaw that dire humanitarian crises would be the trigger for an invasion of Iraq it was incorrect, as this was not the trigger. In 1998 that was a sound assumption, by 2003 it was no longer particulary germaine.
As for Iraq's neighbors, the two that probably mattered most were (and are) Syria and Iran. I honestly can't see anyway that their involvement or buy-in could be obtained.
There was of course a lot of consoltation with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey. Some of which was successful in gaining cooperation, some of which was not. Clearly all of these nations have been involved, at least on a diplomatic and political level, in what has gone on since. Egypt and Pakistan of course are not particularly close to Iraq, but have been involved to some degree as well.
Basically though, it is difficult if not impossible to get a non-democratic nation to support democracy building in principle, as that very principle undermines their legitimacy. Having it would be great of course, but getting it seems near impossible. The report says this would be wonderful, which I agree, but doesn't give any insight into how to get it, which makes it somewhat useless.
I think it unlikely that there would have been an acute humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Saddam had successfully quashed the major rebellious movements, first with the Anfal campaign in the 80s and then in dealing with the Shia uprising after GWI. What remained was the repression and horrible practices of a police state, and those practices were quite horrible, but mass casualty events were probably not going to happen. If you believe, as I do, that Saddam was a continueing threat beyond the repression of his own people the arguement to wait is also not particularly useful.
As for finishing Afghanistan first, there might be something to that, but of course it is not in this report. We could argue various might have beens there, but it wouldn't be germane to if this report is useless.
If your contention is that this report is a reason to have not waged the Iraq war at all, rather than a guide on how to have waged it better, then I agree that it provides some evidence for that. The notion that these issues and problems were 'secret' in 2003 is laughable however. Whether this particular report was known or not,I think that the dangers it talks about were discussed and debated extensively at that time.
What this report does not provide is any guide on how to run an occupation any better. I will be the first to admit, and have frequently, that the U.S. (and anyone else for that matter) doesn't really have a good handle on nation building. Some would say that is a reason not to do it. I say the opposite. I think it an absolutely necessary skill to acquire, and that we (the world as well as the U.S.) will be called on frequently to do so, as advances in technology are going to make failed and totalitarian states more and more dangerous to everyone. We can only learn this very difficult skill by doing it.
Indeed, for me, that was the best reason to invade Iraq.
"We can only learn this very difficult skill by doing it. ".
Hmm, well I will let you go to the local butcher so he can practise his surgery while I will sit and take my chances until he has learned the skills. After all, a surgeon learns much from studying books, theory, and the ideas of his peers before he goes sticking a knife into anything. And of course, the experience of other nations in their efforts at nation building count for nothing because the Brits and the French and the Spanish did not have your technology back in the 1700's and 1800's, huh! "We'll shock and awe 'em and they will welcome us with flowers and kisses!"
I just love the way that your certainty stands out - "There was of course a lot of consoltation with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey. Some of which was successful in gaining cooperation, some of which was not." - which I would have expressed as "some" rather than "a lot". I make the point again that it is very difficult to "consult and persuade" when the first action is slamming the door in the face of your guests.
"As for finishing Afghanistan first, there might be something to that, but of course it is not in this report.". You are correct of course if you read only the words, but I suggest that you look again at the report. It is suggested - recommended, whatever - that the US should consider committing 400,000 troops to any invasion and post-invasion phases. Given that there were a considerable number of US troops in Afghanistan at the time Iraq2 was commenced (no doubt you can provide an accurate number) it was judged that only 200,000 or half the recommended number could be "spared" for Iraq2. To me, it is a logical application of the report (Which is "Desert Crossing", BTW, not "Desert Storm") and its findings that the two campaigns should have been considered as consecutive rather than contemporary.
But then a half is trivial when it is words on paper.
Could you point out to me the British, French and Spanish attempts to create democracies in the 17 and 1800s? Apparently American education is lacking in covering these important historical events. Certainly the U.S. military spends considerable efforts at learning the military skills of history, I doubt you will find many better military historians ever. This includes of course attempts at combating insurgencies.
The first surgeons of course have to learn without a lot of knowledge, and yes they did a lot of damage in the process. I hold that it was necessary for them to do so. Once again though, if their is provable expertise that we are not learning from, point it out to me. Show me the major operations that have worked whose knowledge we are ignoring.
I said that this is a skill that we, being the world not just America, need to learn. I don't think we know it. I also think that it is a necessary skill to have. If their are no surgeons, but you have gangrene, would you prefer to simply wait until someone learns surgery (apparently without actually ever doing it) or take you chances, knowing that to do nothing is fatal?
I have said this to you before, but you seem unable to remember. "You are with us or against us" was NEVER said in the run-up to the war in Iraq. Not once. It was said immediately after Sept. 11 in outlining the War on Terror, and specifically referred to supporting and harboring terrorists. It always meant (and this was apparent at the time) that if you don't act against terrorists in your nation or using your infrastucture (international banking, etc.) that you are against us. I don't think this is unreasonable, but even if it is it had nothing to do with specific commitments on Iraq. The U.S. has never said if you don't join in this military endeavor (even Afghanistan) you are against us.
You are either ignorant of this or purposefully spreading a lie.
U.S. troop commitment in Afghanistan has never been that high. Beyond that, even with no troops in Afghanistan a 400,000 troop level is simply not sustainable in Iraq. We could have chosen to use that many in the initial invasion, but it would have meant less on rotation in the months and years since. It seems probable that this would have been worse, rather than better as the initial invasion was quite successful and it has been the subsequent time period that has proved difficult.
Beyond that, higher levels of foreign troops don't necessarily translate into better results in dealing with a native insurgency. The French tried that in Algerian War of Independence, along with quite brutal tactics, with only limited results (see, we Americans do know some history.) I am willing to engage in discussions about what the proper number of troops should have been, and should be now, but I think it far from apparent that the number deployed was way wrong.
There is, and was, of course considerable debate on this issue, both within and without the military.
"I have said this to you before, but you seem unable to remember. "You are with us or against us" was NEVER said in the run-up to the war in Iraq. Not once. It was said immediately after Sept. 11 in outlining the War on Terror, and specifically referred to supporting and harboring terrorists."
... and how many times has the Iraq campaign been called "the most important action in the War on Terror"?
If you can't make that connection Dave, then I despair of you. George himself did as recently as his 5th anniversary of 9/11 speech. If I lie then so does he.
You might like to consider the history of Australia, Argentina, Congo (Belgium), East Timor, Puerto Rico (before it was ceded to the US), Brazil, New Zealand, any more you want? All of those nations have in their early history war, civil strife, genocide, and corruption.
"Show me the major operations that have worked whose knowledge we are ignoring."
No Dave, [sigh] but why is the US insisting on repeating all of the mistakes? Particularly - as you might recall this was the opening of this discussion - since there were cogent and constructive ideas put forward to achieve exactly the objectives of Iraq2. As you point out, none of which ideas were ever followed.
Once again, it has never been said by Bush, nor has it ever been the policy of the U.S. to declare that anyone not supporting a military action, including the War in Afghanistan or the War in Iraq to be against us in the war on terror. Never. Not once.
It has been said, that if you support terrorists, either directly or tacitly by not preventing them from operating in your territory you are against us.
Do you disagree with that principle? If not, then you agree with the 'with us or against us.'
Of course every nation has a history of war, civil strife, genocide and corruption. EVERY NATION.
Once again, other than not doing it at all, what specific actions do you think that the U.S. should have taken to make the occupation of Iraq better, and where do you find that in Desert Crossing. Desert Crossing presents plenty of reasons why it would be hard (something that is so blindingly obvious it is useless) but nothing actionable on how to do it better.
Perhaps I missed the wonderful British Expedition to free the Austallian aborigines from tyranny and help them establish an independant democracy. My history glossed over that I guess and went right on to the colonization of Australlia and its use as a giant prison. The same for those other 'failures' that you mention.
Certainly I agree that we should not attempt to establish sovreignty over Iraq and make it a subject colony for the purpose of extracting its resources and using its people as slave labor when we are not trying to exterminate them. Since that has never been on the table though, or the subject of controversy it seems to me that the lesson you want us to learn has in fact been learned.
I don't see how we can learn from someone 'failing' when they were not trying to do what we are trying to do in the first place. Learning about how someone failed in a cricket match probably won't help us when we want to learn how to play tennis.
Dave, every one of those examples I gave was based upon the history AFTER the colonists began the process of creating an independant nation.
In NZ, there was the Maori Wars - between the Maori and NZ Government... see my piece on Parihaka as an example.
Australia - most of the "genocide" against the Aborigine occurred during the late 1800's and continued into the mid 1900's. Go catch the movie "Rabbit Proof Fence" for a factual account. The lady about whom the story centres died last year.
Brazil had a hundred years of civil strife with army backed coups against the government AFTER Portugal cut them loose...
Check back on CIA's factbook for potted histories of the others.
Dave, that connect between WOT and "for or against us" is still there. The direct connect between Iraq2 and WOT is still there. A>B, B>C, still gives A>C in my book.
"Dave, that connect between WOT and "for or against us" is still there. The direct connect between Iraq2 and WOT is still there. A>B, B>C, still gives A>C in my book."
Then your book is a very simplistic one.
If your point of 'learning from history' is simply that moving a country to become a vibrant democracy is hard, then I think that point is well known. If therefore you conclude that it is never worth attempting, then I have to disagree. A lot of things are hard, that doesn't mean that they are not worth doing.
Once again. What specific things do you think we should have learned that we have not?
You previously mentioned more troops. I noted that the lessons of history are quite ambiguous on that score, as most clearly demonstrated by the French in Algeria. Certainly none of the histories you present give an unambiguous proof that more troops is any sort of answer. As you point out, most of those don't apply to a foreign occupation in the first place.
You mention involving neighbors, but some if the neighbors are hostile to the concept of the project, Democracy, then their involvement doesn't seem likely to be beneficial, and indeed a good arguement can be made of the opposite would be true. Also of course this doesn't apply to the history you present.
You keep claiming that America hasn't learned. Unless you can tell me what we haven't learned, I must assume that you haven't learned it either, and therefore this is just carping disguiesed as useful criticism.
So tell me, what is it and show how history backs your case. I doubt you can do that, because saying someone doesn't know something is easy, but actually knowing what you are talking about is hard.
"Dave, that connect between WOT and "for or against us" is still there. The direct connect between Iraq2 and WOT is still there. A>B, B>C, still gives A>C in my book."
Then your book is a very simplistic one.
If your point of 'learning from history' is simply that moving a country to become a vibrant democracy is hard, then I think that point is well known. If therefore you conclude that it is never worth attempting, then I have to disagree. A lot of things are hard, that doesn't mean that they are not worth doing.
Once again. What specific things do you think we should have learned that we have not?
You previously mentioned more troops. I noted that the lessons of history are quite ambiguous on that score, as most clearly demonstrated by the French in Algeria. Certainly none of the histories you present give an unambiguous proof that more troops is any sort of answer. As you point out, most of those don't apply to a foreign occupation in the first place.
You mention involving neighbors, but some if the neighbors are hostile to the concept of the project, Democracy, then their involvement doesn't seem likely to be beneficial, and indeed a good arguement can be made of the opposite would be true. Also of course this doesn't apply to the history you present.
You keep claiming that America hasn't learned. Unless you can tell me what we haven't learned, I must assume that you haven't learned it either, and therefore this is just carping disguiesed as useful criticism.
So tell me, what is it and show how history backs your case. I doubt you can do that, because saying someone doesn't know something is easy, but actually knowing what you are talking about is hard.
If I count Korea (very marginal in this line of thought), Vietnam, Somalia and Afghanistan prior to Iraq2 then there are at least two certain or three probable instances where the US has done its best, and with the best of intentions, to unilaterally redirect the future of a nation. There are others that I could add as well. It might be that Chile could be considered as a success provided one accepts the excesses of Pinochet as the desired outcome.
Out of that little collection of experiences one might believe that there was quite a bit of very direct and recent US experience in the "nation rebuilding is not easy" area. Your point about the French in Algeria is a good one as well. Thanks for that one, even if it is not exactly in the line I am following - the French were trying to retain a colonial presence. I would hate to have you think that I was suggesting the US's motives in Iraq were to establish an American colony.
There is a good likelihood that some of the people involved in the "Desert Crossing" report were involved in at least one of those instances.
So, the report was trivial.
No doubt Iraq2 will become as "trivial" as Somalia over the next twenty years. That is some legacy to the men and women who lost their lives...
Let's return to the historical perspective. Most colonies, as they were detached from their colonial administrations, went through turbulent times - army vs government conflict, civil war, attempted culturecide if not direct genocide.
So, how does this relate to "Desert Crossing"?
It is the direct and thoughtful consideration of how to undertake a major military action, and the likely consequences of that action.
I wonder, and as you have asked me this question, what might have been different had the US political and military administrations had given pause to consider this "trivial" report with the intention of avoiding or overcoming the problems that were foreseen. If I were able to answer that question I would not be in this discussion; I would be sitting over the table from the leadership of the US... discussing the next moves in extricating their several posteriors from the holes in which they are jammed.
And I would be a very wealthy man.
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