It is just amazing me how the truth of a matter can be rotated on an imaginary axis in order to “prove” (or support) a preconception that has nothing more than personal opinion in its foundation.

Take the raruraru about Gen McChyrstal as an instance in point.

As I have heard it, the facts are –

1. Rolling Stone magazine approached DoD for permission to interview McChrystal. That permission was granted.

2. The journo took up the task and ended up in a bus with McChrystal travelling to an American installation “somewhere in Afghanistan”

3. Both the bus and those on board were “well fuelled” for the trip – though I doubt that the personnel had been at the diesel, or that the bus was ethanol powered.

4. Most of the published article came from “conversations” on that bus trip.

The “right” are now blaming everyone from President to office boyo at the DoD for the screw-up and McChrystal losing his job as a result.



But in truth, whose “fault” should it be that Rolling Stone was able to print an article which in truth did not reflect well on the American effort in Afghanistan.

The President? Well, “the buck stops here” always should apply. In his position as CinC? He takes overall responsibility for the actions of the Armed Forces.

Secretary of Defence? As titular head of Defence, the buck rests on his desk for the fact that Rolling Stone was given direct access to McChrystal.

Well, how is about McChrystal, the man himself? Ask any person holding “office” in any organisation about their responsibility for presenting their employer to the outside word. What kind of answer would you expect? That they would start by giving the company line then, after a few beers start slagging off their boss, the Board, the Managing Director, The Chairman?

And this is where the “right” come off their trolleys. They ignore the reality of personal responsibility. “Someone” has to be responsible so rather than following events logically they lock the radar onto “the usual suspect”; primarily a person or position with whom they have a problem; whom they wish did not exist; whom they would want to see replaced by some other illiterate hick cowboy like their last.

So, rather than say “McChrystal lost the handle, dropped the ball, so he should take responsibility…”, his actions have to be the “responsibility” of someone else.

Well, let’s get real about this whole shenanigan for a moment. McChrystall is the equivalent of your “major corporate executive”. He should know his ropes. He should not lose the handle.

He did all of that.

He has done it before as well. Almost a year ago to the month.

So, who is right then comes to the fore. Is it McChrystal? His proposal a year back, his strategy then, required an additional 20,000 American troops. That does not seem to have changed. From 07/09 -

Even so, McChrystal has been instructed by his superiors -- including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen -- to conduct a thorough assessment of the war effort and articulate his recommendations. While McChrystal has indicated to some of his advisers that he is leaning toward asking for more forces, he has also emphasized that his strategy will involve fundamental changes in the way those troops are used.

One of the key changes outlined in the latest drafts of the assessment report, which will be provided to Gates by mid-August, is a shift in the "operational culture" of U.S. and NATO forces. Commanders will be encouraged to increase contact with Afghans, even if it means living in less-secure outposts inside towns and spending more time on foot patrols instead of in vehicles.

"McChrystal understands that you don't stop IEDs [improvised explosive devices] by putting your soldiers in MRAPs," heavily armored trucks designed to withstand blasts, said Andrew Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington who served on the assessment team. "You stop them by convincing the population not to plant them in the first place, and that requires getting out of trucks and interacting with people."

The report calls for intelligence resources to be realigned to focus more on tribal and social dynamics so commanders can identify local power brokers and work with them. Until recently, the vast majority of U.S. and NATO intelligence assets had been oriented toward tracking insurgents.

The changes are aimed at fulfilling McChrystal's view that the primary mission of the international forces is not to conduct raids against Taliban strongholds but to protect civilians and help the Afghan government assume responsibility for maintaining security. "The focus has to be on the people," he said in a recent interview.

Now that is a strategy which I fully endorse. It should have been to the fore in both Afghanistan and Iraq from the start.

The very great difficulty with the approach is that it puts American troops "in harm's way". They walk the streets; they talk to the locals; they present a totally different face.

The very big problem that McChrystal has with his military strategy is that runs very much against the political strategy of his CinC in the White House.

So, it comes to who is right?

The President, for whom his electoral mandate to minimise American losses in both theatres is paramount?

Or the man in charge on the ground, for whom a military solution to the Afghani theatre is a matter of personal and Service pride?

Time to ratchet up American paranoia...

... and add to the ol' probligo's worries as well. And, TF, you do not need to "read between the lines" with this story. The only thing puzzling me is how it has missed the right-whinge news feeds in the US. At least until now (19:50 27/4/10 NZST)that is and I have not yet been across to TF's place for a read.

Today's Herald had this article reprinted from Telegraph UK -

Iran and Venezuela have already shown an interest in the Club-K Container Missile System which could allow them to carry out pre-emptive strikes from behind an enemy's missile defences.

Defence experts say the system is designed to be concealed as a standard 40ft shipping container that cannot be identified until it is activated.

Priced at an estimated £10 million, each container is fitted with four cruise anti-ship or land attack missiles. The system represents an affordable "strategic level weapon".

Some experts believe that if Iraq had the Club-K system in 2003 it would have made it impossible for America to invade with any container ship in the Gulf a potential threat.

Club-K is being marketed at the Defence Services Asia exhibition in Malaysia this week.

Novator, the manufacturer, is an advanced missile specialist that would not have marketed the system without Moscow's approval. It has released an emotive marketing film complete with dramatic background music.

It shows Club-K containers stowed on ships, trucks and trains as a neighbouring country prepares to invade with American style military equipment.

The enemy force is wiped out by the cruise missile counter attack.

The ol' probligo is not in any way claiming an ability at prescience. Not one little bit. This is a weapon that was just crying out for development. It would surprise me immensely if such a system was not already an element of the US war machine. The diff obviously being that they would limit sales to one or two good friends - like Israel for example.

So, TF (and any anyone else of like mind), this one does scare the ol' probligo. It is what I have talked of for some years come to fruition.

How to Re(a)d the News - 2

We went north (to Opo) for Easter, to enjoy the last of our summer. Very enjoyable it was too. That was, if you exclude the news...

On Sunday, the SST published this article. It was "speculative" to the extent that the name of one of the suicide bombers in the Moscow metro had not been confirmed.

This later article is bylined 2 April, a fact that might upset some seeing as how that was Good Friday. The News does go on...

When the shooting started Adlan Mutsaev and his friends were in the woods picking garlic. They had arrived in the forest earlier that day, together with a group of neighbours travelling in a battered coach. The plan had been straightforward: stuff their sacks, enjoy the countryside, and then head back home to the Chechen town of Achkoi-Martan.

Without warning, Russian commandos hiding behind a hillock opened fire.Adlan, 16, was with his brother Arbi, 19, and their friends Shamil Kataev, 19, and Movsar Tataev, 19. Shamil and Movsar were both wounded. Adlan was shot in the leg, but managed to hobble into a ditch. He hid. Arbi also attempted to flee, but men in camouflage fatigues caught up with him.

According to the human rights group Memorial, Arbi was forced to drag his two wounded and bleeding friends across the snow. Shamil begged for his life. But the solders were impervious. They placed a blindfold over Arbi's eyes. And then they opened fire: executing Shamil and Movsar on the spot. At least two other garlic pickers suffered the same fate: Ramzan Susaev, 40, and Movsar Dakaev, 17. According to his relatives, Dakaev had pleaded to be allowed on the trip with the others. Wearing a bright green fleece, he took a photo of himself in the woods with his mobile phone. It shows him proudly posing against a craggy backdrop of cliffs and trees covered in snow. A little over 48 hours later his body was discovered.

The misfortune of the four garlic pickers was to have unwittingly strayed into a "counter-insurgency operation" conducted by Russian forces in the densely wooded border between Chechnya and Ingushetia. The soldiers, apparently looking for militant rebels who are waging their own violent campaign against the Russian state, came across the unarmed group, brutally killing them amid the picturesque massif of low hills.

Normally this atrocity on a cold day in February would have raised barely a ripple of attention had it not been for the terrible events in Moscow this week. In a video address on Thursday, Chechnya's chief insurgent leader, Doku Umarov, said Monday's suicide attacks on the Russian capital's metro were in revenge for the killings of the garlic pickers near the Ingush village of Arshaty. He claimed federal security service (FSB) commandos had used knives to mutilate their bodies of the dead boys.

Now I know that this goes completely against the confirmation bias of people who believe that Islam is out for world domination.

Russia's counter-terrorism committee yesterday named the Park Kultury bomber as Dzhanet Abdurakhmanova, saying she was also known as Dzhanet Abdullayeva. Born in 1992, she came from Dagestan. Kommersant newspaper published a photo of her dressed in a black Muslim headscarf holding a pistol. It named the second bomber as 20-year-old Markha Ustarkhanova from Chechnya, describing her as the widow of a militant leader killed last October.

Linked or not, human rights groups say it is undeniable that the brutal actions of Russia's security forces have fuelled the insurgency raging across the North Caucasus region of Russia and the ethnic republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria. This largely invisible war has now reached the Kremlin's doorstep.

"People are abducted. People are killed. There are no guarantees of security," Magomed Mutsolgov, a human rights activist, told the Guardian yesterday, speaking from Nazran, Ingushetia's chief town. Law enforcement and security agencies have committed dozens of summary and arbitrary detentions, acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as extra-judicial executions, rights groups say.

Typically, armed personnel wearing masks encircle a village or district in a "sweep operation". They force their way into homes, beat residents and damage property. Suspected militants are taken away. Many never return. Others are simply shot, and fake weapons planted on them, rights groups allege, citing interviews with victims and relatives.

According to Mutsolgov, the Kremlin's counter-terrorism methods have proved entirely counter-productive: "Violence produces more violence. It drives people to the militant underground."

The nature of the armed conflict in the North Caucasus has also mutated. From 1994 to 1996 Boris Yeltsin fought a war against mainly secular Chechen separatists who wanted – like the newly independent Georgians over the mountains – their own constitution and state. In 1999-2004 president Vladimir Putin fought a second Chechen war. The aim was to crush Chechen separatism.

Now, however, the Kremlin is battling another kind of enemy. The new generation of insurgents have an explicitly Islamist goal: to create a radical pan-Caucasian emirate with sharia law, a bit like Afghanistan under the Taliban. In February Umarov vowed to "liberate" not only the North Caucasus and Krasnodar Krai but Astrakhan – on the Caspian Sea -and the Volga region as well.

The rebels' tactics have also grown more fanatical. Umarov has seemingly revived the suicide squads used by his assassinated predecessor Shamil Basaev. Last summer a suicide truck bomber blew up Nazran's police station. Another bomber succeeded in ramming the car of Ingushetia's president, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. Monday's attack in Moscow was the first in the capital for six years.

I wonder.

Can anyone else see the same dots as I? The dots between action by the "infidel" and the increasing number of volunteers for suicide missions.

I wonder.

Will the connections between "action" and "consequence" ever be realised in the measurement of the futility of "conventional warfare" in the war against terrorism.

I know.

I do not have the answers. I would be immensely powerful and probably equally rich if I did.

It does seem to me that a very large part of the success of that "war" will come from the removal of "cause". Those "perceived (by the terrorists) causes" I would guess to include US support for Israel, poverty (watch for that one to become of even greater import), inequalities and inequities, and many more I can not imagine.

Perhaps it is another "quote" that came over the radio on Saturday afternoon -

If consumption per head of population in China were to reach the same levels as in the US at present we would need "another seven planets"

Totally unsupported (to my knowledge) by any scientific fact, but not an unimaginable conclusion to reach. After all, how many truly obese people do you see in China?

What a sorry pass...

In amongst all of the angst and hair pulling and sackcloth and ashes over the (seemingly rash) refusal to serve two Israeli women, I can but wonder if the same hue and cry would have erupted if a Jewish café owner had refused to serve two Muslim women in hijab.

Oh dear oh dear oh dear!

Ban Ki-Moon will be in trouble with the US - Israel Friendship lobbies. REAL trouble!

UN boss Ban Ki-moon is deeply concerned at Israel's decision to build 884 more houses in east Jerusalem, which is "contrary to international law," his press office said Monday in a statement.

"The secretary general is deeply concerned at the recent announcement by the Israeli government to invite new tenders for construction in Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem," the statement added.

"The government of Israel's continued construction in settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory is contrary to international law and to its commitments under the roadmap and the Annapolis process," it said.

Drafted by the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations, the roadmap for Middle East peace calls for a halt to Jewish settlement activity in Palestinian territories and an end to Palestinian attacks against Israel.

The plan has made little progress since it was drafted in 2003, but Israel and the Palestinians agreed last November to relaunch it during a conference in the US city of Annapolis that restarted the peace process after a seven-year hiatus.

Sunday, Israel announced plans to build 884 more houses in occupied and annexed east Jerusalem...

Condemnation from the US? "Not a sausage".

The Eleventh Hour Epiphany?

What a pity, what a very great pity that this Administration left this move until now. How much different might the world be if this had happened in 2000?

US President George W Bush told Palestinians on Thursday he believed they would sign a peace treaty with Israel within a year that would give them their own state.

Challenging sceptics on the first visit to the West Bank city of Ramallah by a US president, he told a news conference with President Mahmoud Abbas: "I believe it's going to happen, that there will be a signed peace treaty by the time I leave office."

In some of the boldest language he has used since hosting a summit at Annapolis in the United States in November that relaunched peace negotiations after a seven-year hiatus, Bush added: "I am confident that with proper help the state of Palestine will emerge."

Officials have said that any treaty signed by the time Bush steps down next January would not lead to the immediate creation of a new state. A number of formalities would remain and Israel has made it clear it will not end its occupation of the West Bank until it is sure its own territory is safe from attack.

Bush also said that he was unsure that the isolation of the Gaza Strip, a major part of any future state, could be solved within the year. Abbas lost control of the enclave in June to Hamas Islamists who are fighting Israeli forces. Hamas hostility to the peace talks is a major obstacle to any peace deal.

Bush said Washington, Israel's closest ally and now a strong backer of Abbas' administration, stood ready to provide both political and economic backing but that Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert must "come together to make hard choices".

Speaking at the Muqata compound where the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was besieged by Israeli forces just a few years ago, Arafat's successor Abbas hailed Bush as the first US president to commit fully to back a Palestinian state.

The reticence of the US to tackle the problems of the Middle East head-on, Israel and Palestine in particular, in a fair and rational manner has been one of my major criticisms of successive administrations going right back to Carter and the Camp David meetings.

Will this time around the mulberry bush be any different? Certainly I fervently hope. Reality tells me not to hold my breath.

Annapolis 2007

The new edition of The Economist has as its cover story "Mr Palestine" with a very formal photo of GWB.

The accompanying story is an interesting, and thorough examination of the possible directions that the coming Annapolis Summit might take.

What is most heartening is that the Economist's writer has penned exactly the scenario for which I would hope. Starting with the idea that all of those involved - Olmert, Abbas, and to a much less extent Bush - have their hands tied to explosive political realities of their own there would seem to be even less likelihood of Annapolis being any more successful than Camp David (remember the new settlements?) or Oslo.

So what is needed? "How is about a new approach?" says The Economist.

...unless George W. Solomon turns up too
In this speech Mr Bush needs to set out forthrightly America's own plan for dividing Palestine. That would mark an historic change. In the past—in Madrid in 1991, for example, and at Camp David in 2000—the Americans asked the Israelis and Palestinians to thrash out their differences on their own. But they can't. The gap is too wide, and even when their respective leaders want to narrow it neither dares move towards the other for fear of the uproar from the ideological bitter-enders at home. The existence of an American blueprint that commanded international support would, however, immediately transform the political dynamic of both societies, fortifying the moderates and pushing the hardliners to the margins.

Although it would be too much to expect Mr Bush to unfurl a map at Annapolis, he could come quite close. For a start, he should make it clear that when America talks of a two-state solution, it has in mind a border based on the pre-1967 line. Three years ago Mr Bush said in a public letter to Ariel Sharon that it would be unrealistic to expect Israel to evacuate all the dense settlement blocks it has planted in the West Bank. Fine. But since most settlers live close to the old border, he can now tell Israel that it cannot keep more than a few percentage points—say 5% or so—of the West Bank, and that it must offer the Palestinians land from its own side in compensation. On refugees, Mr Bush should say, as Bill Clinton did, that their right to “return” should be exercised in the new Palestine and not in pre-1967 Israel: that is a bitter pill but it is the logic of a peace based on partition. And Israel too must accept a bitter potion: Jerusalem, the beating heart of both peoples, will have to be the capital of both.

If Mr Bush gives this speech, Mr Olmert and Mr Abbas will wax furious. They might agree with him in their hearts, but if only for domestic political consumption they will have to accuse the American president of setting an ambush, bullying the little guys, prejudging the final-status issues and riding roughshod over the views and rights of the people most directly affected. These fulminations can be safely ignored. Israel and the Palestinian territories alike are full of politicians who will tell you knowingly but off the record that only a deal along the lines described above stands the remotest chance of bringing permanent peace. It is high time the superpower and the rest of the world threw their weight behind such a plan. The photo-op at Annapolis may be just the place to do it.

I agree.

I also will not hold my breath. The nature of the American electoral lobbies is such that GWB will be too conscious of the possible effects of such a move on the election of a Repub President in 2008.

What IS "Blackwater USA"?

Read it. It is long. It is detailed. I needed at least two toilet stops along the way...

...during confirmation hearings for Gen. George Casey as Army chief of staff, Senator Jim Webb declared, "This is a rent-an-army out there." Webb asked Casey, "Wouldn't it be better for this country if those tasks, particularly the quasi-military gunfighting tasks, were being performed by active-duty military soldiers in terms of cost and accountability?" Casey defended the contracting system but said armed contractors "are the ones that we have to watch very carefully." Senator Joe Biden, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, has also indicated he will hold hearings on contractors. Parallel to the ongoing investigations, there are several bills gaining steam in Congress aimed at contractor oversight.

Occupying the hot seat through these deliberations is the shadowy mercenary company Blackwater USA. Unbeknownst to many Americans and largely off the Congressional radar, Blackwater has secured a position of remarkable power and protection within the US war apparatus. This company's success represents the realization of the life's work of the conservative officials who formed the core of the Bush Administration's war team, for whom radical privatization has long been a cherished ideological mission. Blackwater has repeatedly cited Rumsfeld's statement that contractors are part of the "Total Force" as evidence that it is a legitimate part of the nation's "warfighting capability and capacity." Invoking Rumsfeld's designation, the company has in effect declared its forces above the law--entitled to the immunity from civilian lawsuits enjoyed by the military, but also not bound by the military's court martial system....

Remember neo-neocon?

... the "liberal who became a Conservative? No, better yet became a Neo-Conservative? (Please note respectful capitalisation there ;-) )

Here is one who has made the journey in the opposite direction...

Once upon a time I supported the Iraq war. In a spasm of suspended belief, I decided as someone who bleeds red, white and blue for his country that I should go along with George Bush’s declarations that Saddam Hussein was a threat even though I knew that my president was a devious liar who put politics ahead of policy. And that I was throwing my support behind what was bound to be a Godawful war.
This decision came, as it did for what I would imagine was a goodly number of people to the left of the right, on the morning of February 5, 2003, as I listened to Secretary of State Colin Powell use what we were later to learn was cooked intelligence regarding WMDs and nukes in declaring to the U.N. that Saddam was a very bad man. (At least he had the last part right.)

Bloodied and bowed, but a whole lot more alive than the 3,100-plus American soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq, I look back on my four-year journey from reluctant supporter to vociferous opponent with shock and awe.

and his conclusion is sad, to say the least...

There are opportunists in the blogosphere who are using the war to promote themselves. Am I one of them? The answer is an equivocal yes. Of course I'm promoting myself every time that I click on the PUBLISH button and send my thoughts out into the blogosphere.

That noted, I would like to think that I am helping pierce the fog of this war. Nevertheless, I can hardly bear to look at that Baghdad map any more, although it’s a rare day that I don’t get up ready to answer the bell.

By my rough count, I have written about 500 pieces on the war. This falls short of the number of bylines I got covering the O.J. Simpson criminal and civil trials, but at least they had endings.


I’m not so sure about the war.

Kurdistan... the next new nation?

H/T to ALD once more.

From New York Review comes this fairly lengthy (and full) discussion on the history, present and future of the Kurdistan region.

Catching the eye...

Turkey's longstanding fear, that the Kurdish federal region in Iraq will declare independence, adding to nationalist passions among its own Kurds, is shared by Iran and Syria, the other countries that have divided up the ancient region of Kurdistan.[4] Shortly before the US invaded Iraq, Iran started to change its former policy of helping PKK militants as a means of exerting pressure on Turkey. Murat Karayilan complains that the Iranians and the Syrians—who, under Turkish pressure, had already reversed their own pro-PKK policy—frequently now capture PKK militants and hand them over to Turkey. Last summer, Iran and Turkey bombed camps in the Kandil Mountains belonging to the PKK and the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), a PKK affiliate dominated by Kurds from Iran, which started launching attacks in 2004 on Iran's security forces. Turkey's army massed menacingly on the Iraqi border. In fear of a land invasion of their territory, and encouraged, perhaps, by the US, the northern Iraqi Kurds persuaded the PKK to announce its current ceasefire, which is only partially observed.

The Turkish government's decision not to enter Iraq shows how constrained it feels in comparison with the final years of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, when it mounted large-scale annual operations in the Kandil Mountains. Turkey is still feeling the effects of its parliament's decision in 2003 to refuse a US request to use Turkey as a launch pad for the Iraq invasion. This decision infuriated the Bush administration and limited Turkey's ability to influence postwar Iraq. America's occupation of Iraq has curtailed Turkey's freedom to move forces in and out of Iraq when it likes; but the Americans have not themselves taken action against the PKK in Iraq, as Turkey has demanded.

It is not surprising that the US, engaged in a demoralizing struggle against insurgents in Iraq's Arab regions, has balked at starting a new offensive in Kurdistan, the calmest part of the country, against an organization that has never attacked it and at the behest of a country that refused its request for help three years ago. Turkey suspects that Bush's appointment of Joseph Ralston, a retired general, to come up with an anti-PKK policy acceptable to the Iraqi and Turkish governments is a smokescreen. More than four months have passed since Ralston was named to his post, but a specially formed contact group, with Turkish and Iraqi representatives, has yet to meet.

If you visit the Kurdish federal region in Iraq, with its own president, parliament, and flag, you may come away, as I did, with the impression that it is on the way to independence. "At this stage," Massoud Barzani, the region's president, told The Wall Street Journal recently, "the parliament of Kurdistan has decided to remain within a federal, democratic Iraq."[5] How long will that decision last? Most Iraqis, and many outsiders, are suspicious of the Kurds' determination to gain ownership of the oil-rich governorate of Kirkuk—a territory with a mixed population of Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and Christians—whose status, according to the constitution, is to be decided by a referendum before the end of 2007. In the words of a recent report by the International Crisis Group, "Kirkuk's oil wealth would enable Kurdish independence.... [The Kurds] know that without Kirkuk, they would govern at most a rump state profoundly dependent on neighbours."[6]

Jalal Talabani, the Kurdish president of Iraq, and a longtime sparring partner of Barzani, is regarded as a restraining influence on the Kurds' irredentist ambitions. In a recent profile of him in The New Yorker, he described the suggestion of Peter Galbraith, a former State Department official, that Iraq should be partitioned, as "wishful thinking.... There is not, I think, a realistic Kurdish leader who would say, 'We want independence.' Why? Because it is impossible."[7]

Some Turkish officials believe that the American government might be protecting the PKK, in order to give its Iranian affiliate, the PJAK, a better chance of destabilizing the Iranian government in the Kurd-dominated areas of northwest Iran. Since the election last year of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad it has become harder to discern what is happening in Iranian Kurdistan. According to Murat Karayilan, the PJAK has slowed its attacks on Iran since the Iranian bombardments this summer, but he says that the attacks are still taking place. It is harder still to gauge the support that the PJAK has, though, in the words of one recent visitor to the region, Iran's Kurds are "transfixed by what is happening in northern Iraq, and the local newspapers report on Barzani as much as they do on Ahmadinejad." Several towns in Iraqi Kurdistan have growing populations of migrants from the Kurdish regions of Iran.

An independent Kurdistan, even if it includes Kirkuk, would still need the goodwill of its neighbors. The Kurds of northern Iraq are already economically dependent on Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran. The head of Diyarbakir's chamber of commerce predicts that by the end of this year, Turkey's exports to the Kurdish federal region in Iraq, particularly of food and building supplies, may total as much as $5 billion. Kirkuk's oil flows to the Mediterranean via Turkey—when the pipeline, which has been repeatedly sabotaged, is able to carry it. Once the US starts withdrawing from Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds will once again feel vulnerable to pressures from Turkey and Iran. Barzani told The Wall Street Journal that he would welcome a deployment of American troops to Iraqi Kurdistan—there are none at present. "It would," he said, "be a "deterrent to intervention by the neighbouring countries."

The US remains officially committed to Iraq's unity, but that could change even before George Bush leaves office. From an American perspective, a new Kurdish state would have much to recommend it. It would be friendly to the US, and as much of a democracy as you are likely to find in the Middle East. But an independent Kurdistan would probably cause Turkey to be even more repressive of its own Kurds, and as a result its chances of entering Europe, which the US has encouraged, will become dimmer. Iran would feel more threatened if there is an independent Kurdistan and would be more likely to intervene secretly and openly in Kurdish affairs. Even if they get hold of Kirkuk, the Iraqi Kurds may find that they have much to gain by putting off their dream of statehood for more than a few years to come.

That last para is a real mixture of ideas - tempting the thought that an independant Kurdistan is not viable but with the hint that Bush might be tempted to make it so.

Feet on the ground suggests that nothing much will change in the short term. Where the greatest opportunity/danger exists is in who actually moves first to get the support of the Kurds.

Will it be an increasingly overt Iran attewmpting to gain protection from the increasingly bellicose US?

Will it be an increasingly concerned US seeking to retain or gain "friends" in the Middle East against foes real and imagined?

Thoughts of Afghanistan...

There is a strange propensity that seems to run right through the blogiverse. Yeah, my hand is up as being guilty as well.

It begins with an idee fixe that suits a particular point of view, a political stance. It becomes, after a time, an inability to apply the central principle to a similar event or situation.

I had a discussion some while back about the relative “reliability” of news sources. I have both weekly and daily tours that I do through the internet media. That includes google news as well as specific stops (The Independant, NYT, WaPo, The Economist, Time etc). GoogleNews is useful for finding “topics du jour” that have not reached the three or four pages that comprises Granny Herald’s “international pages”. In that discussion I rather rashly (or so Robert from Robertopia thought) opined that there were stories that FoxNews either failed or consciously refused to cover.

There is a case in point in this morning’s Herald. It is a story that seems (judging by the level of coverage) to have originated from Canada though the by-line of the Herald story is the Telegraph in London. There is no sign of it thus far in the US media as yet. So, for a start I shall be keeping an eye out for this story there, and particularly the slant that it takes.

There is also a parallel between this story and another that was among the “idee fixe” blogiverse cliches that eminate especially from the US right wing during the past two or three years.

The “corruption in the UN”, Food for Oil scandals, that were synonymous with Kofi Annan are now hopefully going to be consigned to the dustbins of history. At least, that is, until the UN under its new leadership treads on the toes of certain of the leading members. But that is not the subject that I want to follow. It is the one side of the idea I want to follow. A very large part of that accusation and political attitude toward the UN and Anan came from mismanagement and corrupt practices in the Iraq Food for Oil programme. That many of those involved in the corruption and fraud were from the same nations as those making the accusations (Australia’s Wheat Board is a marvellous case in point) is quietly and conveniently glossed (whitewashed?) over. But please, leave the detail there because the connection is a principle rather than the muck. The principle is –
People - including me, the news media, you the reader – are much less prepared to present or to listen to news that runs against our preconceptions than that which supports those preconceptions.

Yes, it is very little more than a recycled version of “confirmation bias”. Exactly.

So, how does that connect with the Herald story? Well, here is it as published in the Melbourne Age.

Corrupt police and tribal leaders are stealing big amounts of reconstruction aid that is intended to improve the lives of ordinary Afghans and turn them away from the Taliban.

Defence officials in the United States and Britain estimate that up to half of the aid in Afghanistan is not reaching the right people.

NATO forces say some Afghan police are guilty of corruption and will steal the aid if it is handed out. Tribal and mosque elders have also been accused of seizing goods, including building materials and fuel, and selling them in markets.

A Pentagon official said thousands of cars and trucks intended for use by the Afghan police had been sold instead.

Last week, the US and European Union announced plans to spend another £7 billion ($A17.7 billion) on help for Afghanistan, of which £1.5 billion will go on reconstruction.

The article concludes –

A joint report by the Pentagon and the US State Department, circulated to congressional committees last month, concluded that the Afghan police force was corrupt to the point of ineffectiveness. One Pentagon official said that police officers had stolen and sold at least half of the equipment supplied by the US.

Now, if I google “Afhan aid corrupt” I should flick something out from US news sources? Yes? No?

No. Not a sausage. There is much about the success of the various aid and development programmes and more especially the changes that result from the military intervention. There is much about the Talib and the problems that the religious fundamentalists are causing. There is very little written on the actual “success” in the rebuilding of the Afghanistan.

That latter point is a continual cri de couer (about both Afghanistan and Iraq) of the right hand side of the blogiverse. I understand why that is. They have to keep the faith. They have to bolster their own beliefs as much as they do try to persuade others of the right, rather than the liberal, right.

And now the news that US/Europe (or is it NATO now?) is throwing another seven billion pounds (in money, not avoirdupois) into the Afghani warlords’ pockets.

And where is the outcry about corruption and waste in those aid programmes?



Update -

A passing thought... The additional aid funding, if all of it reaches Afghanistan, represents -

A 50% increase in income per head of population

a 60% in GDP (over 2005 estimate)

Base numbers from CIA World Factbook and AUD:USD of 0.75

Is this "The New Way" for the Middle East?

Now this is interesting. Why? Well quite simply of course…

First contact was through ALD – that most venerable of news blogs – which listed this article in the National Journal

The Nonwar War Against Iran while the Iraq debate was gripping Washington over the past few weeks, the Bush administration was also shifting its policy toward neighboring Iran -- in a more confrontational direction.

U.S. officials, who asked not to be identified, say that the Iran policy has expanded from focusing chiefly on Iran's nuclear ambitions to challenging Tehran's suspected misbehavior across the Middle East. Indeed, one source said succinctly that the new policy is geared to "confront Iran in every way but direct armed conflict, using all means short of war."

Today, within the past few hours in fact, comes this interview with Gary G Sick in Council for Foreign Relations.

Gary G. Sick, a former National Security Council adviser on Iran, says an “emerging strategy” is developing that brings the United States, Israel, and Sunni Arab states in an informal alliance against Iran. He does not believe the United States would launch a military attack on Iran at this time because it lacks the military ability to be in Iraq and Iran at the same time.

Sick, founder and executive director of Columbia University’s Gulf 2000 Project that conducts research on Persian Gulf countries, also says a “very serious opposition” to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is developing in Iran. Because of this, he says the Iranians will soon be willing to seek a deal on their nuclear program.

Going back a few days there is this little piece from the Jerusalem Post

A quiet Sunni Arab strategic realignment was the topic of conversation among senior American and Israeli analysts - both official and unofficial - gathered
Sunday at the Herzliya Conference run by the Institute for Policy and Strategy of the IDF Herzliya, the opening day of the conference. Many were cautiously optimistic that Iranian influence in the Middle East could be curtailed, and that this process has already begun. The causes: isolation in the international system, economic mismanagement and a growing opposition to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Now whether this is policy or strategy matters little to me. That is mere semantics. What is becoming apparent is (at least I hope this is so) the evolution of a change from gun-boat (or gun-aircraft?) diplomacy as evidenced by GWB’s Iraq adventure to a far more subtle approach.

So, if we start here with NJ -

Bush's new emphasis on Iran's suspected role as a destabilizing force in the region articulates what Middle East experts say is a growing conviction among Washington's Sunni allies that Iran poses an immediate threat to their regimes' interests and stability.

"The administration believes that the Saudis had an epiphany, that Iran is the lens through which they now view all their security concerns," says Patrick Clawson, an Iran expert and the deputy director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "And that means the Saudis may be prepared to do a variety of things which previously they were not prepared to do."

Gary Sick puts it this way –

First, all three parties—the Sunni states in the Gulf, plus Jordan and Egypt—are very worried about Iranian expansion in the region and of Shiite expansion in the Middle East. And of course Israel is very worried about Iran and makes no bones about it quite openly. For the United States, I think there’s a perception that by focusing on Iran, you can remove some of the emphasis on Iraq, which of course is a catastrophe. So there are some advantages to all sides and there also have been real contacts among all of the parties, which I think go beyond just casual talk.

(Interesting little sideline there regarding Iraq, given the SOTU address yesterday – but that is a different story).

And from Jerusalem –

"The Saudis have stopped hiding the fact that there are joint interests for Israel and Saudi Arabia, and [Saudi officials] are telling the media that the Iranian threat is greater than the Israeli one," Col. (res.) Eran Lerman, director of the Israel/Middle East office of the American Jewish Committee and a former senior IDF intelligence analyst, told The Jerusalem Post

…

According to Robert Einhorn, a former US assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation and a member of the American Council on Foreign Relations, "there's a Sunni Arab-Israeli commonality of interest in containing an ideologically agressive Iran."

Einhorn even told the Post that the recent Gulf Cooperation Council declaration that the Gulf states would seek nuclear technology was "a message to Iran that others can do what they are doing and a message to the United States and the West that they had better stop Iran."

There seems to be general agreement on the birth of this new way – Lebanon and Palestine. The support for Hezbollah and Hamas coming out of Iran in particular is creating and or widening the political rift between Sunni and Shia. There are many pressures behind that, especially when you add the impact of Sunni refugees on Saudi Arabia and Jordan. But as these various articles point out the over-arching factor is the threat posed by Iran. NJ again –

The emerging Washington-Saudi-Sunni-Israeli alliance to counter Iran "makes perfect sense," says Kenneth Katzman, a veteran Iran and Iraq analyst at the Congressional Research Service. "It is something that is evolving based on commonality of interests of the Saudis and Israel and other Gulf states to counter Iranian triumphalism. The Saudis are facing Iran in Iraq and in the Gulf states. Israel is facing Iranian-backed Hezbollah on its northern border with Lebanon. The Saudis are interested in their long-standing client in Lebanon, the Hariri family."

Gary Sick is a bit more direct –

I do believe the whole Lebanese situation was the galvanizing moment for this emerging strategy. The action by Hezbollah in attacking Israel [last summer] was seen as an extension of Iranian power and an extension of its influence in the region. And the outcome of this, which is taking the form of Hezbollah challenging the Christian/Sunni government of [Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad] Siniora, I think, is also perceived as an Iranian plot. I personally think that’s an exaggeration, at least in terms of Iranian direct control or involvement in this. But if you look at Hezbollah as an Iranian creature—which I don’t, but many people do—you come to the conclusion this is a battle between Israel and Iran or even, by extension, the United States and Iran, and that Lebanon is the battlefield where this is being fought out.

That final qualification is telling, and it needs to be remembered. But in terms of politik real for all of the participants it can easily be overlooked. It is telling because it comes as a reservation (which as I read it) is a direct consequence of the US approach to Iraq2 and its justification.

That there is a need to deal with Iran, as there was with Iraq, there is no question. I have had a major difficulty with the sabre rattling that has taken place in the past few months; with the sequence of events in all of the various theatres of international politics; and with the Iranian insistence on developing nuclear weapons capability. Given the Hollywood Western approach that Washington has seemed commited to until now; given the total lack of international support and enthusiasm for a repeat of Iraq2 in Iran; and given the current standing of the US Presidential Administration with the American electorate...

I can only say that the development of this "New Way" is about five and a half years too late.

The reductio ad absurdum of American foreign policy...

There is an interesting aspect to watching American politics. For all of their tub-thumping about their (self-appointed) position as the bastion of freedom, the home of democracy, there is still the occasional hole that appears in the fabric.

One of those came this morning, with my morning radio news.

The United States government has admitted the Department of Defence and the CIA have been spying on the financial dealings of Americans.
…
The military and the CIA are restricted in their spying activities inside the United States and are barred from conducting traditional domestic law enforcement work in the country.

Vice-President Dick Cheney has confirmed the main outline of the report, and defended the activities as legal. He told Fox News on Sunday the spying is necessary to protect military installations inside the United States.

He called the spying "a perfectly legitimate activity" that the military and CIA had authority to carry out going back "three or four decades" and more recently confirmed in the Patriot Act adopted following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.

Hmm… So, the first stop is Fox News. Here y’go…

The Pentagon and to a lesser extent the CIA have been using a little-known power to look at the banking and credit records of hundreds of Americans and others suspected of terrorism or espionage within the United States, officials said Saturday.
…
"It is our understanding that the intelligence community agencies make such requests on a limited basis," said Carl Kropf, a spokesman for the Office of the National Intelligence Director, which oversees all 16 spy agencies in the government.
The national security letters permit the executive branch to seek records about people in terror and spy investigations without a judge's approval or grand jury subpoena.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the lead agency on domestic counterterrorism and espionage, has issued thousands of national security letters since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
…
The New York Times reported on expanded use of the technique by the Pentagon and CIA in an article posted Saturday on the Internet.

The vast majority of national security letters are issued by the FBI, but in very rare circumstances they have been used by the CIA before and after 9/11, said a U.S. intelligence official who spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because of the issue's sensitivity.
…
None of the officials reached by the AP commented about the extent of use by the Defense Department agencies, but the Times said military intelligence officers have sent the letters in up to 500 investigations.

Now in the side-bar to that article was a link to the video of the interview with Cheney. No mention of the comments and confirmation of the story as stated by the Herald. Another “hmm” perhaps? Nah. Only joking.

Also on the side-bar was the “latest” RealClearPolitics poll averages. No need to comment there other than to observe that FoxNews did not poll in January. Will they in February?

Following the sidebars again led to Tom Bevan. Now he is a columnist who at least writes with a level of cogency even if I disagree with his politik.

It is rather strange to hear Bevan in one of his recent op-ed RCP pieces suggest…

In general, if I sound pessimistic about the president's "new way forward" in Iraq, it's because I am. That being said, Bush's plan does have a chance of succeeding, and we should all cross our fingers and hope that it does.

I think that I can sympathise with Bevan, at least from the point of view that if you are seeking a life of certainty and security, wealth and happiness, then the current international situation - US vis a vis ROW - would leave much to be desired. After all, it is apparent that the enemies at home are as plentiful and as dangerous as those in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Iran.

It gets even worse when, with all of the best intentions in the Middle East, Ms Rice starts talking to the Palestinians - how is THAT for a totally new approach!!. Not worse in that she is ding that, more power to her arm I say. No, when the Administration - in the form of John Bolton - announces to the world that her efforts are not only doomed to fail but are a total waste of time. When a leading member of your diplomatic team is sabotaging the best efforts for some while to break the Israel/Palestine impass then one really does have to wonder at the level of management and control... the enemy within as well. I wonder if the CIA has a "John Bolton" on its lists for a security letter.

Most galling of all, though, must be the knowledge that US foreign policy has been reduced to "cross your fingers and hope it works".

US strategy in Iraq

Why do I recall that (apochryphal (?sp)) story of the race horse owner with a very slow horse...

"That horse has cost me $100,000 already. It is going to win something if it costs me another $100,000".

Oooo! What a nasty piece of cynicism! :D

Been reading the background to the Ethiopian attacks on Somalia over the past couple weeks. Most recently the news has contained references to a suggestion that the US and Europe (let's hear it everyone - The Concert of Democracies!!!) should provide funding for a pan-African force to try and resolve that conflict. Research is slow, but I have come across this editorial out of Kenya.

Read the whole thing - it provides some interesting analysis and parallels on Somalia. But the conclusion is like a scorpion - with a real sting to it...

Prior to 9/11 as Bush enjoyed his extended vacation and bug-digging excursions with his dogs, the man had no work concept less speak a clue on terrorism, international development and America's role in both. He had no idea he was to be the self-professed "War President". But just what are these wars we are fighting?

After bombing and shredding Afghanistan following his "smoke-em-out-of-holes" threat, the Taliban exist if not with more momentum.

Saddam Hussein is dead despite still missing Al Qaeda links and the absence of weapons of mass destruction. Somalia seems next and there can only be one reason: to give Bush (the war president) a new assignment so that to those that believe him, he worked to the bitter end.

The neo-diplomacy of the US?

The Bush revolution in foreign policy is over. After September 11, the Administration acted on the conviction that an America that dared to shake off the constraints of international rules, laws and institutions could remake the world for the better. What they found instead was that an America unbound alienated allies, empowered adversaries and divided Americans. Faced with an overstretched military and multiplying threats, the Bush Administration in its second term has acknowledged through its deeds what its critics have long argued: The United States, powerful but not omnipotent, needs to work closely with others if it is to solve the foreign policy challenges now confronting it. To paraphrase Richard Nixon, we’re all multilateralists now.

While the Bush Administration’s renewed commitment to cooperate with others resolves one major foreign policy debate of the past six years, it doesn’t resolve another—namely, what kind of multilateralism do we need? President Bush’s conversion to multilateralism has been of a particular sort. It mostly involves traditional diplomacy, typically only with close U.S. allies, and almost always on an ad hoc, problem-oriented tactical basis—as with the decision to take Iran’s nuclear program before the UN Security Council. There is no strategic vision of how international institutions can be shaped to serve longer-range American interests. In many ways, then, President Bush’s second-term multilateralism is a kinder, gentler version of his first-term unilateralism.

As most will already know, those are the opening two paragraphs to Ivo Daalder’s & James Lindsay’s treatise on the direction of American diplomacy published in “The American Interest”. As most will already know it has been picked up by several groups as an almost gospelic statement of future American Foreign Policy. It must be said that there are also those who have panned, dismissed, and trashed the piece.

There is one sentence in the second paragraph which I see as the executive summary definition of the “problem” to which the authors take most of the report to suggest a solution.

There is no strategic vision of how international institutions can be shaped to serve longer-range American interests.

That problem is expanded –

In an era where dangerous developments anywhere can have devastating consequences everywhere, including here at home, we need international institutions capable of prompt and effective action both to prevent and, when necessary, respond to threats to international security. We need institutions that bring together the most capable states that share common interests and perspectives on the dangers confronting us. .

and a solution provided...

A Concert of Democracies, which brings together the world’s established democracies into a single institution dedicated to joint action, fits that bill.

OK, so can I summarise to this point –
 America, and Bush’s America in particular, is still getting its foreign relationships all wrong.
 Bush prefers to act on an ad hoc problem basis, rather than as part of a group.
Culminating with
 There is no strategic vision of how international institutions can be shaped to serve longer-range American interests.
The start of the “solution”
 . We need institutions that bring together the most capable states that share common interests and perspectives on the dangers confronting us.

I need not go any further. The development of the argument is predicatable, slanted to a specific end, and that end has already been spelt out.

I can not overlook the name of the publication – “The American Interest”. That certainly sets the scene well. That is the one over-riding factor. That is the one thing that must, at all costs, be preserved. No other interests, unless they are an unanticipated by-product of the process of the “American Interest”. Remember that as you read both the original paper and my thoughts.

But, in my inimitable fashion, I want to put the “problem” into a slightly different focus.

It is a run of events that did not start with Iraq2. It tracks back further; to Bosnia, to Rwanda. It is not a single “problem”, but a linkage of one organisation – the UN, its charter, the power of veto, and one man – Kofi Annan. Now before the right starts crowing about that small piece of what I am saying I want to be VERY CLEAR. This is not about any allegations of impropriety or wrong doing. This is not about the man, but about his position, the job that he had to do. In the view of many, and especially the American right, Annan has done his job very badly. That criticism I will allow in part. I do not believe that Annan alone is at fault. But I want to draw a comparison between Annan and another powerful individual – George W Bush. Not so that I can criticise him, but to merely point out that BOTH have been doing their own extremely difficult jobs to the best of their abilities. Putting it slightly differently, both men have their supporters and their detractors.

Out of the various linkages at the UN came two events.

First was the total failure of the UN to act against the genocide in Rwanda. That failure came from the reticence of major players, including the US, to accept that their was imminent or actual genocide taking place.

Second was the total inability of the UN to actively support any solution to the Bosnia crisis.

Both failures stem in part from Annan’s strict and pedantic interpretation of one section of the UN Charter preventing that organisation from acting in “the internal affairs of a nation”. (His inability to accept the true place of the UN is evident in his continuing and continual refusal to allow the UN to get involved in Sudan. As long as the Sudanese government says that it is trying to bring the problem undercontrol it is “still an internal matter of governance”. There is absolutely no assistance from the UN membership to get him to change his mind...) There are exceptions, amongst which is the action of genocide. Both failures stem from the inability of nations to act in anything like the coherent manner that the Charter originally foresaw.

The reason for that brief reprise is NOT, as I said earlier, because it is the crux of the debate. It is NOTHING of the sort.

It is the genesis of the idea of the “Concert of Nations”.

So, the “problem” can be restated in the following form –

 The US is desirous to realise its maximum potential, to ensure the safety of the nation, to advance its interests to the full. (See quote above)

 Those desires can not be met or satisfied in a global climate where there is significant opposition to the path that the US wishes to follow. Very frequently that opposition is the result of other, less powerful perhaps but powerful none-the-less, nations being desirous of following their own interests.

One obvious problem is that great powers often refuse to cooperate. Washington may think Beijing should use its economic clout to shut down Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, or that Moscow should halt its nuclear dealings with Tehran, but China and Russia see their interests differently...

So, as I stated earlier, the solution is presented in the form of “Like attracts like”. As the authors point out so clearly it happens that the “like the US” also attracts most of the wealthy nations and none of the most poor.

As the authors develop their idea, they approach the question of “international legitimacy”. Their example of Iraq2 not having the legitimacy of support from the UNSC is given as the problem and dismissed thus –

But should international legitimacy rest on universalism, or at least on the widespread support of the international community as a whole? This notion reduces the criterion of legitimacy to a procedural question: The number of states or votes one can marshal in support of a given action will determine that action’s legitimacy. The nature of the action itself—or the nature of the states consenting to it—matters little, if at all.

...and again with this old chestnut –

...equating legitimacy with the number of states that support a given action ... assumes all states are equal. States may be equal in a procedural sense, but they are not equal in fact. Most states in the world today, including a majority of UN members, do not represent the interests or perspectives of the people they rule. So when it comes to determining international legitimacy, why should states with no legitimacy at home have an equal say as states with such legitimacy? Real legitimacy, like real sovereignty, resides in the people rather than in the states—which is why state decisions to confer international legitimacy must rest in the democratically chosen representatives of the people, not in the personal whims of autocrats or oligarchs.

Now remember that little gem. It returns later.

Obviously, the most important element of the idea is that of “inclusion vs exclusion”. That much is obvious to anyone who has lived with the Commonwealth of Nations. Now perhaps Daalder and Lindsay might have begun to see the flaws in their idea had they taken the time to study this example of “exclusive” international club with even just a passing glance at Wikipedia.

Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the flaws that exist in this example of the “international concert” would be the total inability of the Commowealth to move on Zimbabwe. The question was simple – should Zimbabwe be kicked out? A committee comprising (from memory) Australia, Nigeria and ??Botswana spent so long trying to make up their minds that Zimbabwe more or less left of their own accord in frustration (Mugabe would have enjoyed telling everyone who was responsible for the exclusion).

Daalder and Lindsay pick a different example –

Would Chinese leaders view the creation of a Concert of Democracies as an effort to encircle and constrain it, thereby setting the stage for a new cold war? They might—especially if Washington sought to use the Concert and other foreign policy tools to isolate China. But such an outcome is hardly inevitable (or likely to win the support of other democracies). To suggest that members would have to choose between the Concert and China is to present a false dilemma. The Concert of Democracies is not a substitute for all other forms of multilateral and bilateral cooperation, but a complement to them. At the same time, democracies should not be shy about pursuing their vital interests by working together to build a global order conducive to their political principles. China’s regime certainly has no inhibitions about shaping the global order to suit itself. From Asia to Africa to the Americas, it has been aggressively using its newfound economic strength to advance its interests at the expense of others.

Now that is an extremely interesting bow to draw, given the response and attitude of the US to a “very very good friend” and treaty ally to a small and independently minded country of 4 million people who decided (horror upon horrors) to effectively ban US warships from their waters. Do not imagine for a moment that the US would hesitate to use similar tactics against any dissent from within the Concert of Democracies.

The question of China is also too easily (and glibly) passed over. One of the first challenges to the COD would be not the military challenge from China, but the economic. That is recognised at the end of that last extract. And, it is noted, the thought goes no further. Should that challenge impact upon the form and function of a COD? Yes, IMO, of course it should. I have little doubt that was in the minds of the authors as well.

At this point we should consider the impact of the formation of a COD at the global level. Daalder and Lindsay make no secret of the fact that a large proportion of nations would be excluded (they predict a nice cosy 60 members), and equally as important, the “representation” of some 60% of the global population. The justification for the exclusion is “rational” – those excluded are not “democracies”. More to the point though, they are nations that either can not be relied upon, or would actively oppose, the American direction. Why else was the question raised in the first place?

I have debated this question of “American Interest” in a number of different fora and (regretfully I believe) it does nothing more than raise the ire of Americans, especially those from the right. The debate has come from such beginnings as the invasion of Iraq; or the imposition of a ban on joint defence training exercises between US and NZ forces; or the “free trade” agreement with Australia that allows US agricultural products immediate access to Aussie markets in return for the Aussies waiting some 5 to 7 years before their existing quotas start to expand; or the fact that the greatest part of US aid to poor nations is contracted from US businesses and valued at the purchase price rather than the value to the recipient... the examples are easy to find - look to anything that the US does in the name of “American Interests”.

This “problem of exclusion” raises one other (final) thought.

The US has, since the late 1800’s, occasionally withdrawn from the “real world”. The debate has flared through the blogiverse from time to time over the past four to five years; usually taking the form of “should we or should we not...”.

It strikes me that this idea of the “Concert of Democracies” is not much more than isolationism with a different name, and in the company of a few close mates.

I make no apology for using NZ repeatedly in a discussion like this – think of “New Zealand Interests” as being as important to me as “American Interests” to an American or “British Interests” to a Brit. I make no apology for using history to judge the likely response of one nation to the actions of another. When there is a relative consistency in the nature and reactions of the US to changes in NZ policies, then I would anticipate that consistency to continue into the future...

So, what happens when the US calls together those “friendly democracies” in joint protection against the dangers and threats that are posed by the outside world – the international equivalent of “things that go bump in the night.” What happens when li’l ol’ NZ turns up, a very lucrative FTA with PRC tucked in the back pocket. Or perhaps it is a deal with Iran to provide sheep meat in return for an “understanding” with the Muslim world. Past indications suggest that there would be a polite “leave that at the door” before admission were allowed. Or, to take the idea just that little step further – the threat of expulsion if such an agreement were to be negotiated after formation of the COD.

No. It will not work.

Read “1984” again. The division that Orwell used was between Europe/America and “Oceania/Asia”. Not too far removed from the idea being discussed here when you think about it.

Snapshot of the "average American"...

I could not help a quiet smile.

Reyes sat down with a reporter for the Congressional Quarterly to answer a few questions, like: Is Al Qaeda Sunni or Shia? Answer: Sunni. Reyes stumbled around and tried to sit the fence by saying both. Clueless.

What's the difference, Mr. Intel Committee chairman, between Sunni and Shia? This one actually requires two minutes of reading and even Wikipedia can keep you in the ballpark. Suffice it to say, Shia are followers of Ali, the son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad. Ali was married to the prophet's daughter Fatima, and when the prophet died some Muslims thought Ali should lead Islam and others thought a learned scholar should be the leader, hence the split between Shia, followers of Ali, and Sunni, a long time ago after Muhammad died.

That thumbnail sketch would have gotten him through it, even as crudely as I related it.

Now are there Republicans who voted for the war who don't know these facts? Sure. But we're now talking about the people in charge, and as of January Reyes is in charge and he's clueless.

Pelosi told Brit Hume that the war in Iraq isn't a war, but a situation that needs to be fixed. She picks a guy who doesn't know why Al Qaeda was formed or which branch of Islam it represents.

The Herald this morning mentioned Reyes' response to the question "What is Hezbollah?". He offered to respond in Spanish but, as the Herald article pointed out, it is unlikely that Spain has much to do with the correct answer.

I wonder - I can think of some - a few - NZ politicians who would certainly know the answers to two of the three questions. But what about the likes of the common back-bencher?

Riverbend is back...

It is so good to hear her voice again.

H/t to Donklephant who linked Riverbend's piece on the Iraqi body count. Worth the time to read...

I will admit that as time went on since Riverbend's last post (31 July) I was getting increasingly concerned. There are a number of other who went quiet around the same time. Perhaps now that their autumn is coming on there might be more from them as well.